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Abstract. The note briefly outlines a new model for the explanation of US 
presidential elections, founded on (a) recent economic growth and (b) a 
measure of what may be called “’the cost of ruling”.  The former is based in 
changes in real disposable income for the period following a mid-term election, 
while the latter combines factors of incumbency and terms-in-office.  The model 
is applied to data from the US presidential elections 1932-2008 and has 
considerable explanatory power for the variation in the incumbent party’s 
candidate’s share of the two-party vote (R2=0.74).  The model is controlled 
against a number of other frequent explanations and is found to be quite robust.  
When augmented with approval ratings for incumbent presidents, the 
explanatory power increases to 83 pct. and only incorrectly calls one of the last 
15 US presidential elections.  Applied to the 2012 election as a forecasting model 
the prediction is that President Obama will win 49,6 pct. of the two-party vote. 
 
Keywords: Economic voting; US presidential elections. 
 
JEL-code: D72. 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent decades has witnessed an explosion in the number of 
statistical studies by economists and political scientists to either 
explain or forecast US presidential elections.  The present research 
note adds one more such model. 
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A “Growth and cost-of-ruling” model 
 
We suggest the following basic model: 
 
(1) Dependent variable: The share of the two-party vote won by the 
candidate running as the presidential candidate of the party 
occupying The White House. 
 
(2) Independent variables: 
a) A measure of economic growth in the period from the mid-
term election to the next presidential election.  The reasoning 
is a variation of the argument usually found in the economic 
voting literature: Voters reward or punish in the incumbent 
party on the basis of how the economy is doing.  However, as 
opposed to many other models we do not include any 
arbitrarily selected observation points (say, e.g., 2nd quarter of 
the election year) or arbitrarily weighted averages.  Rather, we 
simply measure change in average real disposable income in 
the period after the mid-term election assuming that the voters 
already have voiced their opinions on that prior occasion. 
b) A measure of “cost of ruling”, involving both incumbency and 
the terms-in-office.  On the one hand, it is a hard fact of US 
presidential politics, that incumbents running for re-election 
rarely lose; the exceptions in modern times being 1992, 1980 
and 1932.  On the other hand, it is also a solid observation that 
it is rare that a party holds power for more than two terms in a 
row; 1989-1993 and 1941-53 being the only examples 
nowadays and with the Roosevelt/Truman years being the 
only modern example of plus-three consecutive terms.  These 
two, somewhat opposed factors, are easily explained: It is, 
ceteris paribus, good to be the incumbent for a large number 
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of reasons; on the other hand, problems and blame may also 
accumulate the longer a party holds power.  The measure is 
constructed by counting the number of terms in office of the 
incumbent party minus 1 if the candidate is an incumbent.  So, 
for example, for 1980 Carter receives a 0, since the Democrats 
had held the White House only one term and Carter was the 
incumbent; in contrast for 1968 and 2008 Humphrey and 
McCain both received a 2, since their parties had had the 
presidency for two terms and they weren’t incumbents.1 
 
Both independent variables share the fact that they are objective and 
exogenous: No polling data or factors endogenous to, say, the 
election campaign are included.  Including only two independent 
variables (other than any controls) is a necessity given the small 
number of observations where we are able to measure economic 
conditions. 
 
Application of the model for elections 1932-2008 
 
Let us apply this base model to the US presidential elections 1932-
2008, using ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression 
analysis.  Doing so we get the results presented in Table 1.  As is 
evident, the model both has high face value and seems fairly robust: 
All coefficients, across different versions, are statistically significant 
and have the expected signs.  The model also has considerable 
explanatory power, explaining 70-74 percent of the variation in vote 
shares, albeit with standard errors ranging from 3.2 to 3.3. 
                                                          
1
 For the present purposes vice presidents who have assumed the presidency 
are counted as “half” incumbents (Truman in 1948, Johnson in 1964, Ford in 
1976). 
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Table 1. Growth and Cost-of-ruling 1932-2008, base model with 
various time periods. 
Variables (1) 
Base model, 1932-
2008 
(2) 
Base model, 1948-
2008 
(3) 
Base model, 1952-
2008 
Constant 49.17**** 
(29.84) 
46.54**** 
(19.62) 
46.87**** 
(20.32) 
Economic growth 0.98**** 
(5.26) 
1.31**** 
(4.13) 
1.28**** 
(4.17) 
Cost of ruling -1.52** 
(-2.57) 
-1.36** 
(-2.22) 
-1.69** 
(-2.64) 
F-statistic 24.36**** 15.15**** 17.13**** 
R2 0.74 0.70 0.74 
S.E.E. 3.30 3.30 3.19 
N 20 16 15 
* p ≤ 0.1; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; **** p ≤ 0.005 
 
 
Controlling for other factors 
 
Obviously, with 74 percent of the variation explained for the years 
1932-2008 and standard errors of 3.3, there is still room for other 
factors to play a role.  For that reason we test the Growth and Cost-
of-Ruling model’s robustness by controlling for other factors.  Table 
2 contains the 1952-2008 base model with only economic growth and 
cost of ruling included (model 3), as well as the results of series of 
alternative specifications.  In each case, only one control variable is 
considered at the time due to the low total number of observations 
(15). 
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Table 2. Growth and Cost-of-ruling 1952-2008, with alternative control variables. 
Variables (3) 
Base model, 
1952-2008 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 46.87**** 
(20.32) 
37.97**** 
(11.68) 
45.87**** 
(18.27) 
44.88**** 
(17.22) 
47.08**** 
(18.98) 
46.81**** 
(15.63) 
46.66**** 
(19.69) 
Economic growth 1.28**** 
(4.17) 
0.83** 
(3.07) 
1.38*** 
(4.27) 
1.31**** 
(4.45) 
1.30*** 
(3.99) 
1.29*** 
(3.23) 
1.35*** 
(4.10) 
Cost of ruling -1.69** 
(-2.64) 
-0.94* 
(-1.77) 
-0.98 
(-1.20) 
-1.57** 
(-2.53) 
-1.69** 
(2.53) 
-1.70*** 
(-2.45) 
-1.77** 
(-2.67) 
Approval ratings -- 0.21*** 
(3.22) 
-- -- -- -- -- 
War casualties -- -- -0.02 
(-1.00) 
-- -- -- -- 
Divided government -- -- -- 2.44 
(1.44) 
-- -- -- 
Party -- -- -- -- -0.60 
(-0.34) 
-- -- 
Negative trend -- -- -- -- -- 0.06 
(0.98) 
-- 
Stocks -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.07 
(-0.72) 
F-statistic 17.13**** 23.85**** 11.75*** 13.12**** 10.61**** 10.47**** 11.14**** 
R2 0.74 0.87 0.70 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.75 
S.E.E. 3.19 2.34 3.19 3.06 3.32 3.33 3.26 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
* p ≤ 0.1; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; **** p ≤ 0.005 
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One model (4) adds Gallup’s presidential approval ratings from last 
week of October in the election year, assuming that there will be a 
positive relationship.  Approval ratings are, of course, not the 
“causes” of election outcomes but rather an expression of 
satisfaction with the incumbent party’s president and may to some 
extent be hypothesized to catch factors not measurable by economic 
conditions alone. 
Another model (5) adds Douglas Hibbs’ measure of 
cumulated US war casualties in US-initiated invasions abroad 
(Hibbs 2000; Hibbs 2008), assuming that any effect will be negative 
due to the unpopularity of such human costs.  A third model (6) 
adds a dummy for whether another party controls one or more 
chambers of Congress, assuming that any effect will be positive, 
since “divided government” and “gridlock” gives the governing 
party an “enemy” to run against.   A fourth model (7) adds a 
dummy for whether the incumbent party is the GOP in order to 
control for any partisan effects.  A fifth model (8) adds a variable 
counting the number of quarters with negative growth in real 
disposable income in the election year, in order to control for trends 
leading up to the election.  Finally, a model (9) adds change in Dow 
Jones Industrials in the first nine months of the election year, 
assuming that any effect will be positive. 
 As the results in Table 2 demonstrate the variables of the 
base model are quite robust to the control for other factors: The 
signs of the two coefficients never change, and the variables of the 
base model usually remain statistically significant (with the 
exception of the cost-of-ruling in one case, model 5).  With the 
exception of presidential approval ratings (model 4) none of the 
control variables come out statistically significant. 
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Using the latter we have a model with high explanatory 
power, both in terms of winners and variation explained.2  Figure 1 
shows the correlation between the predicted vote shares and the 
actual vote shares for the candidates running for the incumbent 
party.  The model’s retroactive forecasts only err once in predicting 
the right popular vote winner out of the 15 elections 1952-2008: 
Gerald Ford’s defeat with 48,95 pct. of the two-party vote in 1976.  
For the remaining 14 elections five popular vote losers were 
correctly predicted and eight popular vote winners similarly, while 
one election result essentially was too close to call (1960). 
                                                          
2 The model bears some resemblance to one of the “Time for Change”-models 
developed by Alan Abramowitz, which includes (a) a measure of economic 
growth; (b) a dummy for whether or not an incumbent is running or not; (c) 
presidential approval ratings (Abramowitz 2008).  There are differences though, 
as the present model includes growth in real personal disposable income for the 
whole post-midterm period and also includes terms-in-office together with 
incumbency.  More recently Abramowitz has added a fourth variable 
measuring “polarization”, but with the possible risk of some statistical over-
determination of the model. 
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Figure 1. Correlation between predicted and actual vote shares for incumbent 
party’s candidate 1952-2008. 
 
Altogether the model explains approximately 87 pct. of the variation 
in the incumbent party’s candidate’s share of the two-party vote. 
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Figure 2. 
 
 
A perspective on the 2012 election 
 
Using data for growth in real disposable income for the quarters 
following the mid-term election (0.75 for 2011-12), a measure of the 
cost of ruling (0), and approval ratings at the end of October 2012 
(51 pct. positive), the expanded model forecasts that President 
Obama will win 49.6 percent of the two-party vote.  Without the 
inclusion of approval ratings the model predicts Obama to win only 
a more modest 47.8 percent of the two-party vote.  Given the size of 
10 
 
the models’ standard errors, this essentially means that the election 
is too close to call with any significant degree of probability. 
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